update restricted shell to force (–no-kill) option.

Dockerfile

@@ -134,6 +134,11 @@ RUN id -u socktop &>/dev/null || useradd -m -s /bin/bash socktop && \
     mkdir -p /home/socktop/.config/socktop && \
     chown -R socktop:socktop /home/socktop
 
+# Unprivileged user that per-session shells run as (see docker/session-shell.sh).
+# Separate from socktop so a session cannot signal the server, the agent, or
+# anything else that matters — the kernel refuses cross-UID signals.
+RUN useradd -m -s /usr/sbin/nologin demo
+
 # Set working directory
 WORKDIR /app
 
@@ -155,7 +160,8 @@ COPY --from=node-builder /build/node_modules ./node_modules
 COPY docker/entrypoint.sh /entrypoint.sh
 COPY docker/init-config.sh /init-config.sh
 COPY docker/restricted-shell.sh /usr/local/bin/restricted-shell.sh
-RUN chmod +x /entrypoint.sh /init-config.sh /usr/local/bin/restricted-shell.sh
+COPY docker/session-shell.sh /usr/local/bin/session-shell.sh
+RUN chmod +x /entrypoint.sh /init-config.sh /usr/local/bin/restricted-shell.sh /usr/local/bin/session-shell.sh
 
 # Expose ports
 # 8082 - webterm HTTP server
@@ -166,18 +172,15 @@ EXPOSE 8082 3001
 HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=3s --start-period=5s --retries=3 \
     CMD curl -f http://localhost:8082/ || exit 1
 
-# Create a wrapper script that detects if running as root or socktop user
+# entrypoint.sh handles both cases itself: as root it prepares /home/demo,
-RUN echo '#!/bin/bash\n\
+# runs the agent as the socktop user, and keeps webterm-server as root so it
-    if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then\n\
+# can drop each session to the demo user (CAP_SETUID/CAP_SETGID); as non-root
-    # Running as root - use init-config.sh to set up and switch to socktop\n\
+# it behaves as before (single-UID, no session drop).
-    exec /init-config.sh "$@"\n\
+RUN ln -sf /entrypoint.sh /docker-entrypoint.sh
-    else\n\
-    # Running as socktop user - directly execute entrypoint\n\
-    exec /entrypoint.sh "$@"\n\
-    fi' > /docker-entrypoint.sh && chmod +x /docker-entrypoint.sh
 
 # Set entrypoint to the wrapper
 ENTRYPOINT ["/docker-entrypoint.sh"]
 
-# Default command - use restricted shell that only allows socktop commands
+# Default command - sessions enter via session-shell.sh (per-session privilege
-CMD ["webterm-server", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "8082", "--command", "/usr/local/bin/restricted-shell.sh"]
+# drop when root) which execs the restricted shell that only allows socktop
+CMD ["webterm-server", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "8082", "--command", "/usr/local/bin/session-shell.sh"]

docker-compose.yml

@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ services:
       # Optional: Set timezone
       - TZ=America/New_York
 
+      # Disable socktop's local process-kill feature in every session
+      - SOCKTOP_NO_KILL=1
+
       # Optional: Logging level
       - RUST_LOG=info
 

docker/entrypoint.sh

@@ -54,12 +54,41 @@ setup_alacritty() {
     echo "Alacritty setup complete"
 }
 
+# Prepare the home directory for the unprivileged `demo` user that sessions
+# run as (see docker/session-shell.sh). Sessions need read access to the
+# socktop profiles and CA certs, which are mounted under /home/socktop — copy
+# them across and rewrite the cert paths, since demo cannot traverse another
+# user's mounts reliably. Root-only: without root there is no demo user split.
+prepare_demo_home() {
+    if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
+        return
+    fi
+    echo "Preparing /home/demo for session user..."
+    mkdir -p /home/demo/.config/socktop/certs /home/demo/.config/alacritty
+    if [ -f /home/socktop/.config/socktop/profiles.json ]; then
+        cp /home/socktop/.config/socktop/profiles.json /home/demo/.config/socktop/profiles.json
+        sed -i 's|/home/socktop/|/home/demo/|g; s|/var/lib/socktop/|/home/demo/|g' /home/demo/.config/socktop/profiles.json
+    fi
+    cp /home/socktop/.config/socktop/certs/*.pem /home/demo/.config/socktop/certs/ 2>/dev/null || true
+    cp /home/socktop/.config/alacritty/*.toml /home/demo/.config/alacritty/ 2>/dev/null || true
+    chown -R demo:demo /home/demo
+    chmod -R go-w /home/demo
+    echo "  ✓ /home/demo ready"
+}
+
 # Start socktop agent
 start_socktop_agent() {
     echo "Starting socktop-agent on port 3001..."
 
-    # Start socktop-agent in the background on port 3001
+    # Start socktop-agent in the background on port 3001. When root, drop it
-    /usr/bin/socktop_agent --port 3001 > /tmp/socktop-agent.log 2>&1 &
+    # to the socktop user — it only reads /proc and system metrics, and a
+    # separate UID keeps it out of reach of the demo session user.
+    if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
+        setpriv --reuid socktop --regid socktop --clear-groups --inh-caps -all --no-new-privs \
+            /usr/bin/socktop_agent --port 3001 > /tmp/socktop-agent.log 2>&1 &
+    else
+        /usr/bin/socktop_agent --port 3001 > /tmp/socktop-agent.log 2>&1 &
+    fi
     AGENT_PID=$!
 
     echo "socktop-agent started (PID: $AGENT_PID)"
@@ -85,6 +114,9 @@ main() {
     # Set up Alacritty
     setup_alacritty
 
+    # Home directory for the per-session demo user
+    prepare_demo_home
+
     # Start socktop agent
     start_socktop_agent
 

docker/restricted-shell.sh

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ CYAN='\033[0;36m'
 NC='\033[0m' # No Color
 
 # History file
-HISTFILE="/home/socktop/.socktop_history"
+HISTFILE="${HOME:-/tmp}/.socktop_history"
 HISTSIZE=1000
 
 # Load history from file
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ main() {
                 # Allow socktop with validated arguments only
                 if [ "$cmd" = "$input" ]; then
                     # No arguments, use default (local profile)
-                    /usr/bin/socktop -P local
+                    /usr/bin/socktop --no-kill -P local
                 else
                     # Validate and sanitize arguments to prevent command injection
                     # Only allow: -P <profile_name> or ws://<url>
@@ -144,11 +144,11 @@ main() {
                     if [[ "$args" =~ ^-P[[:space:]]+[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$ ]]; then
                         # Extract profile name and validate it
                         profile=$(echo "$args" | sed 's/-P[[:space:]]\+//')
-                        /usr/bin/socktop -P "$profile"
+                        /usr/bin/socktop --no-kill -P "$profile"
                     # Check for websocket URL (ws:// or wss://)
                     elif [[ "$args" =~ ^wss?://[a-zA-Z0-9\.\:/_-]+$ ]]; then
                         # Validate websocket URL format
-                        /usr/bin/socktop "$args"
+                        /usr/bin/socktop --no-kill "$args"
                     else
                         # Reject anything else as potentially dangerous
                         echo -e "${RED}Error:${NC} Invalid arguments for socktop"

kubernetes/03-deployment.yaml

@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ spec:
               "--port",
               "8082",
               "--command",
-              "/usr/local/bin/restricted-shell.sh",
+              "/usr/local/bin/session-shell.sh",
             ]
 
           ports:
@@ -115,6 +115,13 @@ spec:
               value: "America/New_York"
             - name: RUST_LOG
               value: "info"
+            # Disable socktop's local process-kill feature for every socktop
+            # launched anywhere under this pod, regardless of command line.
+            # The restricted shell also passes --no-kill, but this is the layer
+            # a visitor cannot route around (no way to unset env from the
+            # restricted shell).
+            - name: SOCKTOP_NO_KILL
+              value: "1"
 
           resources:
             limits:
@@ -158,14 +165,24 @@ spec:
             - name: socktop-home
               mountPath: /var/lib/socktop
 
+          # webterm-server runs as in-container root holding ONLY
+          # CAP_SETUID/CAP_SETGID (everything else dropped, no privilege
+          # escalation), so it can drop each websocket session to the
+          # unprivileged `demo` user via session-shell.sh. The kernel then
+          # refuses any signal a session aims at the server, the agent
+          # (running as `socktop`), or another session's UID — the kill
+          # feature's UI gating stops being the only line of defense.
           securityContext:
             allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
             capabilities:
               drop:
                 - ALL
+              add:
+                - SETUID
+                - SETGID
             readOnlyRootFilesystem: false
-            runAsUser: 100
+            runAsUser: 0
-            runAsGroup: 101
+            runAsGroup: 0
 
       volumes:
         - name: config