update restricted shell to force (–no-kill) option.
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@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ spec:
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"--port",
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"8082",
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"--command",
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"/usr/local/bin/restricted-shell.sh",
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"/usr/local/bin/session-shell.sh",
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]
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ports:
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@@ -115,6 +115,13 @@ spec:
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value: "America/New_York"
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- name: RUST_LOG
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value: "info"
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# Disable socktop's local process-kill feature for every socktop
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# launched anywhere under this pod, regardless of command line.
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# The restricted shell also passes --no-kill, but this is the layer
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# a visitor cannot route around (no way to unset env from the
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# restricted shell).
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- name: SOCKTOP_NO_KILL
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value: "1"
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resources:
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limits:
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@@ -158,14 +165,24 @@ spec:
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- name: socktop-home
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mountPath: /var/lib/socktop
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# webterm-server runs as in-container root holding ONLY
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# CAP_SETUID/CAP_SETGID (everything else dropped, no privilege
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# escalation), so it can drop each websocket session to the
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# unprivileged `demo` user via session-shell.sh. The kernel then
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# refuses any signal a session aims at the server, the agent
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# (running as `socktop`), or another session's UID — the kill
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# feature's UI gating stops being the only line of defense.
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securityContext:
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allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
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capabilities:
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drop:
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- ALL
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add:
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- SETUID
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- SETGID
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readOnlyRootFilesystem: false
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runAsUser: 100
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runAsGroup: 101
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runAsUser: 0
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runAsGroup: 0
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volumes:
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- name: config
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